FIRST
DIVISION
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RUJJERIC Z. PALAGANAS,[1] Petitioner, - versus
- PEOPLE OF THE Respondent. |
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G.R. No. 165483 Present: PANGANIBAN, C.J. Chairperson, YNARES-SANTIAGO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO,
SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO,
JJ. Promulgated: |
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For what is a man, what has he got?
If not himself, then he has naught.
To say the things he truly feels;
And not the words of one who kneels.
The record shows I took the blows -
And did it my way!
The song evokes the bitterest passions. This is not the first time the song “My Way”[2]
has triggered violent behavior resulting in people coming to blows. In the case at bar, the few lines of the song
depicted what came to pass when the victims and the aggressors tried to outdo
each other in their rendition of the song.
In
this Petition for Review on Certiorari[3]
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, petitioner Rujjeric
Z. Palaganas prays for the reversal of the Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22689 dated
On
That on or about January 16, 1998, in the evening at Poblacion, Manaoag, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with an unlicensed firearm, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, conspiring together, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot SERVILLANO FERRER, JR. y Juanatas, inflicting upon him “gunshot wound penetrating perforating abdomen, urinary bladder, rectum bullet sacral region,” the accused having thus performed all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of Murder as a consequence, but which nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of the causes independent of the will of the accused and that is due to the timely medical assistance rendered to said Servillano J. Ferrer, Jr. which prevented his death, to his damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY to Art. 248 in relation with Arts. 6
and 50, all of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
CRIMINAL
CASE NO. U-9609
That on or about January 16, 1998, in the evening at Poblacion, Manaoag, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with an unlicensed firearm, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, conspiring together, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot MICHAEL FERRER alias “Boying Ferrer”, inflicting upon him gunshot wound on the right shoulder, the accused having thus performed all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but which nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of the causes independent of the will of the accused and that is due to the medical assistance rendered to said Michael “Boying” Ferrer which prevented his death, to his damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY to Art. 248 in relation with Arts. 6
and 50, all of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-9610
That on or about January 16, 1998, in the evening at Poblacion, Manaoag, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused armed with an unlicensed firearm, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, conspiring together, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot MELTON FERRER alias “TONY FERRER”, inflicting upon him mortal gunshot wounds in the head and right thigh which caused the instantaneous death of said Melton “Tony” Ferrer, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
CONTRARY to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659.
CRIMINAL
CASE NO. U-9634
That on or
about January 16, 1998 which is within the election period at Poblacion, Manaoag, Pangasinan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously bear and carry one (1) caliber .38 without first securing the
necessary permit/license to do the same.
CONTRARY to COMELEC RES. 2958 in relation with SEC. 261 of the OMNIBUS
ELECTION CODE, as amended.[9] (Underscoring supplied.)
When arraigned on separate dates,[10]
petitioner and Ferdinand entered separate pleas of “Not Guilty.” Upon motion of Ferdinand,[11]
the four cases were consolidated and were assigned to Branch 46 of the RTC in Urdaneta, Pangasinan.[12]
The factual antecedents as viewed by the prosecution,
are summarized in the Comment dated
On
Thereafter,
at
Meantime,
Edith Palaganas, sister of Jaime and the owner of the
bar, arrived and pacified them. Servillano noticed
that his wristwatch was missing. Unable
to locate the watch inside the bar, the Ferrer
brothers went outside. They saw
Ferdinand about eight (8) meters away standing at
On the other hand, the defense, in its Appellant’s
Brief dated
On January 16,
1998, at around 11:00 in the evening, after a drinking session at their house,
the brothers Melton (Tony), Servillano (Junior) and
Michael (Boying), all surnamed Ferrer,
occupied a table inside the Tidbits Café and Videoke
Bar and started drinking and singing. About thirty minutes later, Jaime Palaganas along with his nephew Ferdinand (
After the Ferrers’ turn in singing, the microphone was handed over to
Jaime Palaganas, who then started to sing. On his third song [My Way], Jaime was joined
in his singing by Tony Ferrer, who sang loudly and in
an obviously mocking manner. This
infuriated Jaime, who then accosted Tony, saying, “You are already insulting
us.” The statement resulted in a free for
all fight between the Ferrers’, on one hand, and the Palaganases on the other. Jaime was mauled and Ferdinand,
was hit on the face and was chased outside of the bar by Junior and Boying Ferrer.
Ferdinand
then ran towards the house of the appellant Rujjeric Palaganas, his brother, and sought the help of the latter. Rujjeric, stirred
from his sleep by his brother’s shouts, went out of his house and, noticing
that the van of his uncle was in front of the Tidbits Videoke
Bar, proceeded to that place. Before
reaching the bar, however, he was suddenly stoned by the Ferrer
brothers and was hit on different parts of his body, so he turned around and
struggled to run towards his house. He
then met his brother, Ferdinand, going towards the bar, so he tugged him and
urged him to run towards the opposite direction as the Ferrer
brothers continued pelting them with large stones. Rujjeric then
noticed that Ferdinand was carrying a gun, and, on instinct, grabbed the gun
from the latter, faced the Ferrer brothers and fired
one shot in the air to force the brothers to retreat. Much to his surprise, however, the Ferrer brothers continued throwing stones and when (sic) the
appellant was again hit several times. Unable
to bear the pain, he closed his eyes and pulled the trigger.
On
In holding that petitioner is liable for the crimes of
Homicide and Frustrated Homicide but not for Murder and Frustrated Murder, the
trial court explained that there was no conspiracy between petitioner and
Ferdinand in killing Melton and wounding Servillano
and Michael.[18]
According to the trial court, the mere fact that Ferdinand “pointed” to where
the Ferrer brothers were and uttered to petitioner “Araratan, paltog mo lara!” (They are the ones,
shoot them!), does not in itself connote common design or unity of purpose to
kill. It also took note of the fact that
petitioner was never a participant in the rumble inside the Tidbits Cafe Videoke Bar (videoke bar) on the
night of
Further, it declared that there was no treachery that will
qualify the crimes as murder and frustrated murder since the Ferrer brothers were given the chance to defend themselves
during the shooting incident by stoning the petitioner and Ferdinand.[19]
It reasoned that the sudden and
unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on the part of the victims,
was absent. In addition, it ratiocinated
that there was no evident premeditation as there was no sufficient period of
time that lapsed from the point where Ferdinand called the petitioner for help
up to the point of the shooting of the Ferrer
brothers.[20] Petitioner was sleeping at his house at the
time he heard Ferdinand calling him for help. Immediately, petitioner, still clad in pajama
and sleeveless shirt, went out of his room to meet Ferdinand. Thereafter, both petitioner and Ferdinand went
to the videoke bar where they met the Ferrer brothers and, shortly afterwards, the shooting
ensued. In other words, according to the
trial court, the sequence of the events are so fast that it is improbable for
the petitioner to have ample time and opportunity to then plan and organize the
shooting.
Corollarily, it also
stated that petitioner cannot successfully invoke self-defense since there was
no actual or imminent danger to his life at the time he and Ferdinand saw the Ferrer brothers outside the videoke
bar.[21]
It noted that when petitioner and
Ferdinand saw the Ferrer brothers outside the videoke bar, the latter were not carrying any weapon. Petitioner then was free to run or take cover
when the Ferrer brothers started pelting them with
stones. Petitioner, however, opted to
shoot the Ferrer brothers. It also stated that the use by petitioner of a
gun was not a reasonable means to prevent the attack of the Ferrer
brothers since the latter were only equipped with stones, and that the gun was
deadlier compared to stones. Moreover,
it also found that petitioner used an unlicensed firearm in shooting the Ferrer brothers.[22]
As regards the Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2958, in
relation to Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, the trial court acquitted
the petitioner of the offense as his use and possession of a gun was not for
the purpose of disrupting election activities.[23]
In conclusion, the trial court held:
WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered as follows:
1.
Under CRIM. CASE NO. U-9610, [Rujjeric]
PALAGANAS is hereby CONVICTED beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE
(Not Murder) with the use of an unlicensed firearm. The penalty imposable is in its maximum period
which is 20 years. The Court sentences [Rujjeric] Palaganas to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Temporal in its maximum period or 20 years of
imprisonment; and to pay the heirs of [MELTON] Ferrer
the sum of P7,791.50 as actual medical expenses
of [MELTON] Ferrer; P500,000.00 as moral
damages representing unearned income of [MELTON]; P50,000.00 for the
death of [MELTON]; P50,000.00 for exemplary damages and P100,000.00
for burial and funeral expenses.
Ferdinand Palaganas is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove conspiracy and likewise, for failure to prove the guilt of Ferdinand Palaganas beyond reasonable doubt.
2.
Under CRIM. CASE NO. U-9608, [Rujjeric]
PALAGANAS is hereby CONVICTED beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE (Not Frustrated Murder), with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, the Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of Prision
Mayor in its maximum period or 12 years of imprisonment and to pay Servillano Ferrer the sum of P163,569.90
for his medical expenses and P50,000.00 for exemplary damages;
Ferdinand Palaganas is ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove conspiracy and likewise, for failure to prove the guilt of Ferdinand Palaganas beyond reasonable doubt.
3.
Under CRIM. CASE NO. U-9609, [Rujjeric]
PALAGANAS is hereby CONVICTED beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of FRUSTRATED
HOMICIDE (Not Frustrated Murder), with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the
Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of Prision
Mayor in its maximum period or 12 years of imprisonment; and to pay Michael Ferrer the sum of P2,259.35 for his medical expenses
and P50,000.00 for exemplary damages;
Ferdinand Palaganas is ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove conspiracy and likewise, for failure to prove the guilt of Ferdinand Palaganas beyond reasonable doubt.
Ordering accused [Rujjeric] Palaganas to pay Mrs.
Elena Ferrer, the mother of the Ferrer
brothers, the amount of P100,000.00 as
attorney’s fees in CRIM. CASES NOS. U-9608, U-9609, U-9610.
4. Under CRIM. CASE NO. U-9634, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of [Rujjeric] Palaganas beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2958 in relation with Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, the Court ACQUITS [RUJJERIC] PALAGANAS.[24]
Aggrieved, the petitioner appealed the foregoing Decision of
the RTC dated
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the MODIFICATION that the penalty to be imposed for the crimes which the appellant committed are as follows:
(1) For Homicide
(under Criminal Case No. U-9610), the appellant is ordered to suffer
imprisonment of ten (10) years of prision
mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal as maximum. Appellant is
also ordered to pay the heirs of Melton Ferrer civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00
without need of proof and actual damages in the amount of P43,556.00.
(2) For Frustrated
Homicide (under Criminal Case No. U-9609), the appellant is hereby ordered to
suffer imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correcional as minimum to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum. Appellant is also ordered to pay Michael Ferrer actual damages in the amount of P2,259.35 and moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00.
(3) For Frustrated
Homicide (under Criminal Case No. U-9608), the appellant is
hereby penalized with imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correcional
as minimum to ten (10) years of prision
mayor as maximum. Appellant
is also ordered to pay Servillano Ferrer
actual damages in the amount of P163,569.90 and
moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00.[27]
On
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION OF THE TRIAL COURT.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON THE GROUND OF LAWFUL SELF-DEFENSE.[28]
Anent the first issue, petitioner argued that all the
elements of a valid self-defense are present in the instant case and, thus, his
acquittal on all the charges is proper; that when he fired his gun on that
fateful night, he was then a victim of an unlawful aggression perpetrated by
the Ferrer brothers; that he, in fact, sustained an
injury in his left leg and left shoulder caused by the stones thrown by the Ferrer brothers; that the appellate court failed to
consider a material evidence described as “Exhibit O”; that “Exhibit O” should
have been given due weight since it shows that there was slug embedded on the sawali wall near the sign “Tidbits Café and Videoke Bar”; that the height from which the slug was taken
was about seven feet from the ground; that if it was true that petitioner and
Ferdinand were waiting for the Ferrer brothers
outside the videoke bar in order to shoot them, then
the trajectory of the bullets would have been either straight or downward and
not upward considering that the petitioner and the Ferrer
brothers were about the same height (5’6”-5’8”); that the slug found on the wall
was, in fact, the “warning shot” fired by the petitioner; and, that if this
exhibit was properly appreciated by the trial court, petitioner would be
acquitted of all the charges.[29]
Moreover, petitioner contended that the warning shot proved
that that the Ferrer brothers were the unlawful
aggressors since there would have been no occasion for the petitioner to fire a
warning shot if the Ferrer brothers did not stone
him; that the testimony of Michael in the trial court proved that it was the Ferrer brothers who provoked petitioner to shoot them; and
that the Ferrer brothers pelted them with stones even
after the “warning shot.”[30]
Petitioner’s contention must fail.
Article 11, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code provides
for the elements and/or requisites in order that a plea of self-defense may be
validly considered in absolving a person from criminal liability, viz:
ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. – The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. x x x.
As an element of self-defense, unlawful aggression refers to
an assault or attack, or a threat thereof in an imminent and immediate manner,
which places the defendant’s life in actual peril.[31]
It is an act positively strong showing
the wrongful intent of the aggressor and not merely a threatening or
intimidating attitude.[32]
It is also described as a sudden and
unprovoked attack of immediate and imminent kind to the life, safety or rights
of the person attacked.[33]
There is an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim
when he puts in actual or imminent peril the life, limb, or right of the person
invoking self-defense. There must be
actual physical force or actual use of weapon.[34] In order to constitute unlawful aggression,
the person attacked must be confronted by a real threat on his life and limb;
and the peril sought to be avoided is imminent and actual, not merely
imaginary.[35]
In the case at bar, it is clear that there was no unlawful
aggression on the part of the Ferrer brothers that
justified the act of petitioner in shooting them. There were no actual or imminent danger to the
lives of petitioner and Ferdinand when they proceeded and arrived at the videoke bar and saw thereat the Ferrer
brothers. It appears that the Ferrer brothers then were merely standing outside the videoke bar and were not carrying any weapon when the
petitioner arrived with his brother Ferdinand and started firing his gun.[36]
Assuming, arguendo, that the
Ferrer brothers had provoked the petitioner to shoot
them by pelting the latter with stones, the shooting of the Ferrer
brothers is still unjustified. When the Ferrer brothers started throwing stones, petitioner was not
in a state of actual or imminent danger considering the wide distance (4-5
meters) of the latter from the location of the former.[37] Petitioner was not cornered nor trapped in a
specific area such that he had no way out, nor was his back against the
wall. He was still capable of avoiding
the stones by running away or by taking cover. He could have also called or proceeded to the
proper authorities for help. Indeed,
petitioner had several options in avoiding dangers to his life other than
confronting the Ferrer brothers with a gun.
The fact that petitioner sustained injuries in his left leg
and left shoulder, allegedly caused by the stones thrown by the Ferrer brothers, does not signify that he was a victim of
unlawful aggression or that he acted in self-defense.[38]
There is no evidence to show that his
wounds were so serious and severe. The
superficiality of the injuries sustained by the petitioner is no indication
that his life and limb were in actual peril.[39]
Petitioner’s assertion that, despite the fact that he fired a
warning shot, the Ferrer brothers continued to pelt
him with stones,[40]
will not matter exonerate him from criminal liability. Firing a warning shot was not the last and
only option he had in order to avoid the stones thrown by the Ferrer brothers. As
stated earlier, he could have run away, or taken cover, or proceeded to the
proper authorities for help. Petitioner,
however, opted to shoot the Ferrer brothers.
It is significant to note that the shooting resulted in the
death of Melton, and wounding of Servillano and
Michael. With regard to Melton, a bullet
hit his right thigh, and another bullet hit his head which caused his instant
death.[41]
As regards Servillano,
a bullet penetrated two of his vital organs, namely, the large intestine and
urinary bladder.[42] He underwent two (2) surgeries in order to
survive and fully recover.[43]
Michael, on the other hand, sustained a
gunshot wound on the right shoulder.[44]
It must also be noted that the Ferrer brothers were shot near the videoke
bar, which contradict petitioner’s claim he was chased by the Ferrer brothers. Given
the foregoing circumstances, it is difficult to believe that the Ferrer brothers were the unlawful aggressors. As correctly observed by the prosecution, if
the petitioner shot the Ferrer brothers just to
defend himself, it defies reason why he had to shoot
the victims at the vital portions of their body, which even led to the death of
Melton who was shot at his head.[45] It is an oft-repeated rule that the nature
and number of wounds inflicted by the accused are constantly and unremittingly
considered important indicia to disprove a plea of self-defense.[46]
Let it not be forgotten that unlawful aggression is a
primordial element in self-defense.[47]
It is an essential and indispensable
requisite, for without unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, there can
be, in a jural sense, no complete or incomplete
self-defense.[48] Without unlawful aggression, self-defense will
not have a leg to stand on and this justifying circumstance cannot and will not
be appreciated, even if the other elements are present.[49]
To our mind, unlawful aggression, as an element of self-defense, is wanting in
the instant case.
The second element of
self-defense requires that the means employed by the person defending himself must
be reasonably necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression of the
victim. The reasonableness of the means
employed may take into account the weapons, the physical condition of the
parties and other circumstances showing that there is a rational equivalence
between the means of attack and the defense.[50] In the case at bar, the petitioner’s act of
shooting the Ferrer brothers was not a reasonable and
necessary means of repelling the aggression allegedly initiated by the Ferrer brothers. As
aptly stated by the trial court, petitioner’s gun was far deadlier compared to
the stones thrown by the Ferrer brothers.[51]
Moreover, we stated earlier that when the Ferrer
brothers allegedly threw stones at the petitioner, the latter had other less
harmful options than to shoot the Ferrer brothers. Such act failed to pass the test of reasonableness
of the means employed in preventing or repelling an unlawful aggression.
With regard to the second issue, petitioner asserts that the
Court of Appeals erred in not acquitting him on the ground of lawful
self-defense.
Petitioner’s argument is bereft of merit.
In resolving criminal
cases where the accused invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, this
Court consistently held that where an accused admits killing the victim but
invokes self-defense, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he acted in self-defense.[52]
As the burden of evidence is shifted on
the accused to prove all the elements of self-defense, he must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution.[53]
As we have already found, there was no unlawful aggression on
the part of the Ferrer brothers which justified the act
of petitioner in shooting them. We also
ruled that even if the Ferrer brothers provoked the
petitioner to shoot them, the latter’s use of a gun was not a reasonable means
of repelling the act of the Ferrer brothers in
throwing stones. It must also be
emphasized at this point that both the trial court and the appellate court
found that petitioner failed to established by clear
and convincing evidence his plea of self-defense. In this regard, it is settled that when the
trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings
are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court.[54] In the present case, we find no compelling
reason to deviate from their findings. Verily,
petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled
to an acquittal on the ground of lawful self-defense.
On another point, while we agree with the trial court and the
Court of Appeals that petitioner is guilty of the crime of Homicide for the
death of Melton in Criminal Case No. U-9610, and
Frustrated Homicide for the serious injuries sustained by Servillano
in Criminal Case No. U-9608, we do not, however, concur in their ruling that
petitioner is guilty of the crime of Frustrated Homicide as regards to Michael
in Criminal Case No. U-9609. We hold that petitioner
therein is guilty only of the crime of Attempted Homicide.
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code states and defines the
stages of a felony in the following manner:
ART. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. – Consummated felonies, as well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.
A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for the for its execution and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason or causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance (italics supplied).
Based on the foregoing provision, the distinctions between
frustrated and attempted felony are summarized as follows:
1.)
In frustrated felony, the offender has performed all
the acts of execution which should produce the felony as a consequence; whereas
in attempted felony, the offender merely commences the commission of a felony
directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution.
2.)
In frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment
of the crime is some cause independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the
other hand, in attempted felony, the reason for the non-fulfillment of the
crime is a cause or accident other than the offender’s own spontaneous
desistance.
In addition to these distinctions, we have ruled in several
cases that when the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his
use of a deadly weapon in his assault, and his victim sustained fatal or mortal
wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance, the crime
committed is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide depending on whether or
not any of the qualifying circumstances under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code are present.[55]
However, if the wound/s sustained by the
victim in such a case were not fatal or mortal, then the crime committed is
only attempted murder or attempted homicide.[56]
If there was no intent to kill on the
part of the accused and the wound/s sustained by the victim were not fatal, the
crime committed may be serious, less serious or slight physical injury.[57]
Based on the medical certificate of Michael, as well as the
testimony of the physician who diagnosed and treated Michael, the latter was
admitted and treated at the
With regard to the appreciation of the aggravating
circumstance of use of an unlicensed firearm, we agree with the trial court and
the appellate court that the same must be applied against petitioner in the instant
case since the same was alleged in the informations filed
against him before the RTC and proven during the trial. However, such must be considered as a special
aggravating circumstance, and not a generic aggravating circumstance.
Generic aggravating circumstances are those that generally
apply to all crimes such as those mentioned in Article 14, paragraphs No. 1, 2,
3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 18, 19 and 20, of the Revised Penal Code. It has the effect of increasing the penalty
for the crime to its maximum period, but it cannot increase the same to the
next higher degree. It must always be
alleged and charged in the information, and must be proven during the trial in
order to be appreciated.[60]
Moreover, it can be offset by an
ordinary mitigating circumstance.
On the other hand, special aggravating circumstances are
those which arise under special conditions to increase the penalty for the
offense to its maximum period, but the same cannot increase the penalty to the
next higher degree. Examples are
quasi-recidivism under Article 160 and complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code. It does not change the
character of the offense charged.[61]
It must always be alleged and charged in
the information, and must be proven during the trial in order to be
appreciated.[62] Moreover, it cannot be offset by an ordinary
mitigating circumstance.
It is clear from the foregoing that the meaning and effect of
generic and special aggravating circumstances are exactly the same except that
in case of generic aggravating, the same CAN be offset by an ordinary
mitigating circumstance whereas in the case of special aggravating
circumstance, it CANNOT be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.
Aside from the aggravating circumstances abovementioned,
there is also an aggravating circumstance provided for under Presidential
Decree No. 1866,[63]
as amended by Republic Act No. 8294,[64]
which is a special law. Its pertinent provision states:
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
In interpreting the same provision, the trial court reasoned
that such provision is “silent as to whether it is generic or qualifying.”[65] Thus, it ruled that “when the law is silent,
the same must be interpreted in favor of the accused.”[66] Since a generic aggravating circumstance is
more favorable to petitioner compared to a qualifying aggravating circumstance,
as the latter changes the nature of the crime and increase the penalty thereof
by degrees, the trial court proceeded to declare that the use of an unlicensed
firearm by the petitioner is to be considered only as a generic aggravating
circumstance.[67] This interpretation is erroneous since we
already held in several cases that with the passage of Republic Act. No. 8294
on
As was previously established, a special aggravating
circumstance cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance. Voluntary surrender of petitioner in this case
is merely an ordinary mitigating circumstance. Thus, it cannot offset the special aggravating
circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm. In accordance with Article 64,
paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty imposable on petitioner
should be in its maximum period.[69]
As regards the civil liability of petitioner, we deem it
necessary to modify the award of damages given by both courts.
In Criminal Case No. U-9610 for
Homicide, we agree with both courts that the proper amount of civil indemnity
is P50,000.00, and that the proper amount for
moral damages is P50,000.00 pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.[70] However, based on the receipts for hospital,
medicine, funeral and burial expenses on record, and upon computation of the
same, the proper amount of actual damages should be P42,374.18, instead of P43,556.00. Actual damages for loss of earning capacity
cannot be awarded in this case since there was no documentary evidence to
substantiate the same.[71] Although there may be exceptions to this
rule,[72]
none is availing in the present case.
Nevertheless, since loss was actually established in this case,
temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00
may be awarded to the heirs of Melton Ferrer. Under Article 2224 of the New Civil Code,
temperate or moderate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some
pecuniary loss was suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty. Moreover, exemplary damages should be awarded
in this case since the presence of special aggravating circumstance of use of
unlicensed firearm was already established.[73] Based on prevailing jurisprudence, the award
of exemplary damages for homicide is P25,000.00.[74]
In Criminal Cases No. U-9608 and
U-9609, we agree with both courts as to the award of actual damages and its
corresponding amount since the same is supported by documentary proof
therein. The award of moral damages is
also consistent with prevailing jurisprudence.
However, exemplary damages should be awarded in this case since the
presence of special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm was
already established. Based on prevailing
jurisprudence, the award of exemplary damages for both the attempted and
frustrated homicide shall be P25,000.00 for
each.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated
(1) In Criminal Case
No. U-9609, the petitioner is found guilty of the crime of attempted homicide. The penalty imposable on the petitioner is prision correccional
under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code.[75]
There being a special aggravating
circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence of Law, the penalty now becomes four (4) years and two (2) months of arresto mayor as minimum period to six (6)
years of prision correccional
as maximum period. As regards the civil
liability of petitioner, the latter is hereby ordered to pay Michael Ferrer exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 in addition to the actual damages and moral damages
awarded by the Court of Appeals.
(2) In Criminal Case
No. U-9608, the penalty imposable on the petitioner for the frustrated homicide
is prision mayor under Article 50 of
the Revised Penal Code.[76]
There being a special aggravating
circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the penalty now becomes six (6) years of prision
correccional as minimum period to twelve (12)
years of prision mayor as maximum
period. As regards the civil liability
of petitioner, the latter is hereby ordered to pay Servillano
Ferrer exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 in addition to the actual damages and moral damages
awarded by the Court of Appeals.
(3) In Criminal Case
No. U-9610, the penalty imposable on petitioner for the homicide is reclusion
temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.[77]
There being a special aggravating
circumstance of the use of an unlicensed firearm and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the penalty now is twelve (12) years of prision
mayor as minimum period to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal
as maximum period. As regards the civil
liability of petitioner, the latter is hereby ordered to pay Melton Ferrer exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 in addition to the actual damages and moral damages
awarded by the Court of Appeals. The
actual damages likewise awarded by the Court of Appeals is hereby reduced to P42,374.18.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate Justice
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ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
[1] Also referred to as Rojeric Palaganas y Zarate in the Informations, and Decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
[2] Music by Paul Anka; Sung and popularized by Frank Sinatra.
[3] Rollo, pp. 9-23.
[4] Penned by Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso with Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; rollo, pp. 24-43.
[5] Penned by Judge Modesto C. Juanson; id. at 44-75.
[6] Records, Volume I, pp. 1-2 and 10, Volume II, pp. 1-2 and Volume III, p.1.
[7] RULES AND REGULATIONS ON: (A) BEARING, CARRYING OR TRANSPORTING FIREARMS OR OTHER DEADLY WEAPONS; (B) SECURITY PERSONNEL OR BODYGUARDS; (C) BEARING ARMS BY ANY MEMBER OF SECURITY OR POLICE ORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT AND OTHERS; (D) ORGANIZATION OR MAINTENANCE OF REACTION FORCES DURING THE ELECTION PERIOD IN CONNECTION WITH THE MAY 11, 1998 ELECTIONS. (Promulgated on December 23, 1997).
[8] Omnibus
Election Code of the
[9] Rollo,
pp. 45-47.
[10] Records, Volume I, p. 43; Volume II, p. 39, and Volume III, p. 41.
[11]
[12]
[13] Rollo, pp. 101-119.
[14] CA rollo, pp. 123-148.
[15] Rollo, pp. 44-75.
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31] People v. Alconga, 78 Phil. 366, 374 (1947).
[32] People v. Arizala, 375 Phil. 666, 675 (1999).
[33] People v. Bausing, G.R. No. 64965,
[34] People v. Crisostomo, 195 Phil. 162, 172 (1981).
[35] Senoja v. People, G.R. No. 160341,
[36] Records, TSN,
[37] CA rollo, p. 132.
[38]
[39]
[40] Rollo, pp. 18-19.
[41] CA rollo, p.
40, records, TSN,
[42]
[43]
[44]
[45] Rollo, p. 117.
[46]
[47] People v. Cario, G.R. No. 123325,
[48] People v. Gallego, 453 Phil. 825, 839 (2003).
[49] People v. Caratao, 451 Phil. 588, 602 (2002).
[50] People v. Encomienda, 150-B Phil. 419, 433-434 (1972).
[51] Rollo, p. 70.
[52] Rendon v. People, G.R. No. 127089,
[53] People v. Castillano, Sr., 448 Phil. 482, 499-500 (2003).
[54] People v.
Castillo, G.R. No. 118912,
[55] People v. Costales, 424 Phil. 321, 334 (2002).
[56] People v. Castillo, 426 Phil. 752, 768 (2002).
[57] People v. Asuela, 426 Phil. 428, 452 (2002).
[58] Supra note 43.
[59]
[60] Rule 110, Sections 8 and 9 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
[61] People v. Agguihao, G.R. No. 104725,
[62] Supra note 59.
[63] CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN, ACQUISITION OR DISPOSITION, OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES; AND IMPOSING STIFFER PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR RELEVANT PURPOSES.
[64] AN ACT AMENDING THE PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1866, AS AMENDED, ENTITLED: CODIFYING THE LAWS ON ILLEGAL/UNLAWFUL POSSESSION, MANUFACTURE, DEALING IN, ACQUISITION OR DISPOSITION, OF FIREARMS, AMMUNITION OR EXPLOSIVES; AND IMPOSING STIFFER PENALTIES FOR CERTAIN VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR RELEVANT PURPOSES.( 6 June 1997)
[65] Rollo, pp. 71-72.
[66]
[67]
[68] People v. Lumilan, 380 Phil. 130, 145 (2000); People v.
Castillo, 382 Phil. 503 (2002); People v. Malinao,
G.R. No. 128148,
[69] ART. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods. - In cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the provisions of articles 76 and 77, the courts shall observe for the application of the penalty the following rules, according to whether there are or are no mitigating or aggravating circumstances:
x x x
3. When only an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, they shall impose the penalty in its maximum period.
[70] People v. Bangcado, G.R. No. 132330,
[71] Nueva
España v. People, G.R. No. 163351, 21 June 2005, 460 SCRA 547, 556.
[72] The rule is that documentary
evidence should be presented to substantiate a claim for loss of earning
capacity. By way of exception, damages
therefore may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence if there
is testimony that the victim was either (1) self-employed, earning less than
the minimum wage under current labor laws, and judicial notice is taken of the
fact that in the victim’s line of work, no documentary evidence is available;
of (2) employed as a daily-wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under
current labor laws.
[73] People v. Manambay,
G. R. No. 130684,
[74] Lamis
v. Ong, G.R. No. 148923,
[75] ART. 51. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of attempted crime. - The penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempt to commit a felony.
[76] ART. 50. Penalty to be imposed upon principals of a frustrated crime. - The penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principal in a frustrated felony.
[77] ART. 249. Homicide. – Any person who, not falling within the provisions of article 246 shall kill another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by reclusion temporal.